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Anti-virus software based on unsupervised hierarchical clustering (HC) of malware samples has been shown
to be vulnerable to poisoning attacks. In this kind of attack, a malicious player degrades anti-virus
performance by submitting to the database samples specifically designed to collapse the classification
hierarchy utilized by the anti-virus (and constructed through HC) or otherwise deform it in a way that would
render it useless. Though each poisoning attack needs to be tailored to the particular HC scheme deployed,
existing research seems to indicate that no particular HC method by itself is immune. We present results on
applying a new notion of entropy for combinatorial dendrograms to the problem of controlling the influx of
samples into the data base and deflecting poisoning attacks. In a nutshell, effective and tractable measures of
change in hierarchy complexity are derived from the above, enabling on-the-fly flagging and rejection of
potentially damaging samples. The information-theoretic underpinnings of these measures ensure their
indifference to which particular poisoning algorithm is being used by the attacker, rendering them particularly
attractive in this setting.
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ABSTRACT
Anti-virus software based on unsupervised hierarchical clustering (HC) of malware samples has been shown to
be vulnerable to poisoning attacks. In this kind of attack, a malicious player degrades anti-virus performance by
submitting to the database samples specifically designed to collapse the classification hierarchy utilized by the
anti-virus (and constructed through HC) or otherwise deform it in a way that would render it useless. Though
each poisoning attack needs to be tailored to the particular HC scheme deployed, existing research seems to
indicate that no particular HC method by itself is immune. We present results on applying a new notion of
entropy for combinatorial dendrograms to the problem of controlling the influx of samples into the data base and
deflecting poisoning attacks. In a nutshell, effective and tractable measures of change in hierarchy complexity
are derived from the above, enabling on-the-fly flagging and rejection of potentially damaging samples. The
information-theoretic underpinnings of these measures ensure their indifference to which particular poisoning
algorithm is being used by the attacker, rendering them particularly attractive in this setting.
Keywords: poisoning attack, hierarchical clustering, hierarchical entropy measure
1. INTRODUCTION
Rapid detection of cyber-attacks such as viruses, worms, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), botnets, is a crit-
ical aspect of cyber-security, and many implemented and potential algorithms are available for this purpose. A
key underpinning technology in many advanced cyber-attack detection algorithms is some form of hierarchical
clustering (HC) method. Such methods appear in detecting malware, viruses, and worms,1–3 identifying com-
promised domains in DNS traffic,4 classifying sources and methods of attacks,5–7 detecting DDoS and privacy
attacks,8–10 identifying hacker and cyber criminal communities,11 detecting repackaged code in applications for
mobile devices,12 and clustering of files.13 Many other examples demonstrate the fundamental importance of
HC to cyber-security; see for instance Refs. 4, 14,15.
Given the central role of HC in cyber-security it is critical to understand and design around the vulnerabilities
of hierarchical clustering methods. An interesting set of articles by Biggio et al.4,16,17 highlights a major
vulnerability in HC: sensitivity to poisoning attacks. Biggio et al.4 emphasizes the centrality of clustering of
malware families in the identification of common characteristics and the design of suitable countermeasures. As
they point out, common approaches to clustering, including the single-linkage hierarchical clustering (SLHC)
method,18 are then susceptible to “poisoning” of the input data to the clustering algorithm, which leads to
a flawed classification and creates opportunities for disguising an attack. They provide a method for such a
poisoning attack on a behavioral clustering algorithm based on “bridges” to link clusters that would otherwise
be distinct.4 Their analysis provides convincing poisoning schemes against other existing algorithms.16,17
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that, by employing natural entropy based diversity measures devel-
oped here, one could counter poisoning attacks against the SLHC method using a fairly simple reactive control
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mechanism based on allowing only small variations in the above measures for each time step. The idea is that
large variations of the measure may only occur as a result of very coarse-grained alterations in the underlying
hierarchy.
Our work extends the notion of Shannon entropy19 from the domain of partitions to the domain of hierarchies.
By viewing clustering of a data set as a lossy encoding of the data, we develop a quantitative measure of diversity
(or information) for a hierarchy. Abrupt falls in the amount of hierarchical information content encoded by a
previously effective database of malware samples will serve as a good indicator that recent entries may have been
“poison pills”.
While this scheme suffices for demonstrating a capability for withstanding hypothetical poisoning attacks
of the kind simulated by Biggio et al., there is no doubt that more intricate approaches are required for more
realistic settings (e.g. in the presence of compression), as well as for the more meaningful ones (e.g. in the
presence of a learning algorithm which varies the dissimilarity mapping on the feature space of samples — a
central design component for determining the clustering hierarchy of the database — as a function of the input).
These are set aside as topics for future research.
2. PRELIMINARIES
This section reviews some of the notions and results from Ref. 20 required for discussing hierarchies, as well as
for motivating and constructing the “discrete entropy” measure we propose for combinatorial hierarchies. We
retain the notations of Ref. 20. Where proofs of statements are appropriate, they are provided in the Appendix.
2.1 Weights, metrics
Let X be a finite non-empty set. By WgtX we denote the set of all non-negative real-valued and symmetric
functions w : X ×X −→ R satisfying wxx = 0 for all x ∈ X, and henceforth refer to them simply as weights on
X. We will usually denote w(x, y) by wxy. When thinking of e = xy as an undirected edge in the complete graph
on X we will also use the symbol we to denote the value w(x, y). Two sub-spaces of WgtX are of special interest
in this paper: MetX , the space of all weights w satisfying the triangle inequality (†); and UltX , the sub-space of
all weights satisfying the ultra-metric inequality (‡):
(†) ∀x,y,z∈X wxz ≤ wxy + wyz , (‡) ∀x,y,z∈X wxz ≤ max{wxy, wyz}
Despite prevailing conventions we will refer to elements of MetX and UltX as “metrics” and “ultra-metrics”,
respectively∗. Also, all operations and comparisons among weights are to be understood as pointwise operations
and comparisons, e.g., we write u ≤ v for u, v ∈WgtX to mean uxy ≤ vxy for all x, y ∈ X, and analogously for
operations such as sums, products, and max.
2.2 Hierarchies and Single-Linkage Hierarchical Clustering (SLHC)
In the Introduction we reviewed the many motivations for restricting attention to distance-based clustering in the
context of unsupervised hierarchical classification schemes, and singled out the distinguished role of single-linkage
hierarchical clustering (SLHC) in this context. Now we establish the relevant language, to be used throughout
this work.
2.2.1 Hierarchies and Ultra-Metrics
A well-established equivalence between phylogenetic hierarchies (also known as dendrograms) and ultra-metrics
has been known for decades.21 Namely, given an ultra-metric u ∈ UltX and any ε ≥ 0, a partition [u]ε of X is
defined as the quotient space of the relation x ∼ y ⇐⇒ uxy ≤ ε. This relation is an equivalence relation because
u is an ultra-metric. The resulting family of partitions ([u]ε)ε>0, also known as the dendrogram associated with
∗It is unnecessary in the context of this paper to enforce the convention that metrics (resp. ultra-metrics) also satisfy
wxy > 0 whenever x 6= y. Under this convention our metrics would qualify only as “quasi-metrics” — or “semi-metrics”
for some — but we find it easier to use a shorter, more inclusive nomenclature.
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Figure 1. Red circles represent blocks of a partition P , represented in terms of distances according to (1).
u, has the property that [u]ε refines [u]δ whenever ε ≤ δ. By this we mean that every block B ∈ [u]ε is contained
in a block of [u]δ.
Example 2.1 (Partitions as Ultra-Metrics). Let P be a partition of X. For any x ∈ X denote the
block of P containing x by P (x). Define:
ηP =
{
0 if P (x) = P (y) ,
1 if P (x) 6= P (y) . (1)
Then ηP is an ultra-metric, called the partition ultra-metric associated with P — see Figure 1. It is easy to see
that [ηP ]ε = P for all ε ∈ [0, 1), and becomes the trivial partition {X} for all ε ∈ [1,∞).
Since X is finite, the family ([u]ε)ε≥0 only has finitely many distinct elements. In fact, no more than |X|:
starting with [u]0, blocks of the partition [u]ε keep fusing together as we increase ε, the process ending for
ε ≥ diam(X,u), where [u]ε becomes a single block. The list of distinct partitions obtained in this way, written in
order of reverse refinement, will be referred to as the combinatorial structure of u, denoted S(u). The coarsest
non-trivial partition in S(u) will be referred to as the top split associated with u. The following lemma summarizes
some well-known and useful properties — also see Figure 2:
ε [u]ε
1 2 3 4
P0: {1},{2},{3},{4}
ε0=u12
P1: {1,2},{3},{4}
ε1=u34
P2: {1,2},{3,4}
ε2=u13
ε2=u14
} P3: {1,2,3,4}
Figure 2. The dendrogram representation of an ultra-metric u on the space X = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The distance uxy is recovered
as the least height ε (left,blue) for which x, y occur in the same block of the partition [u]ε (right,red), giving rise to the
presentation of u in the form (2).
Lemma 2.2. Let u ∈ UltX have structure S(u) : P0, P1, . . . , Pk. Let εi−1 denote the least value of ε for which Pi
refines [u]ε. Then: (1) k ≤ |X| − 1; (2) ε0 < ε1 < . . . < εk−1; and (3) u may be rewritten in the form:
u = max
i=0,...,k−1
εiη
Pi (2)
In particular, any u ∈ UltX takes at most |X| − 1 non-zero values. Those are ε0 < . . . < εk−1.
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The set of all possible structures (ranging over all possible u ∈ UltX) will be referred to as the set of
combinatorial dendrograms or hierarchies over X.
2.2.2 Geometry of the Space of Metrics, and Spanning Trees
Let KX denote the complete graph on the vertex set X. By a spanning tree T ⊂ E(KX) of X we mean a
collection of edges of KX which, together with the vertex set X, forms a tree. We denote the set of all spanning
trees by Trees(X). Then, viewed as subsets of the vector space of all real-valued maps E(KX) −→ R, the spaces
WgtX and MetX are both pointed closed convex cones with vertex at the origin, where WgtX coincides with the
non-negative orthant and MetX is a sub-cone of it. Both have a natural decomposition as the union of pairwise
interiorly-disjoint simplicial cones of the form W (T ) (denoted C(T ) for MetX), where: (1) T ∈ Trees(X), and
(2) w ∈ W (T ) (repectively w ∈ C(T )) if and only if T is a minimal spanning tree (MST) for the weight w
(resp. metric) — see Lemmas 2.4 and 2.5 in Ref. 20. The collection of minimal spanning trees associated with
a particular weight/metric w is denoted by MST(w).
Example 2.3 (MSTs for a Partition). Let P be a partition of X. It would be sensible to guess that a
minimal spanning tree for ηP is the union of a spanning forest F of total weight zero with respect to ηP with a
set G of |P |− 1 edges satisfying the requirement that the image of G under the contraction mapping KX −→ KP
induced by the natural quotient mapping X −→ P is any spanning tree of KP (see Figure 3). We shall see
presently that a similar description holds for all ultra-metrics.
0
0
0
0
0
11
1
0
0
0
0
0
11
1
Figure 3. Constructing an MST for the partition ultra-metric from Figure 1. Black edges represent length 0 edges belonging
to ‘local’ MSTs of the individual blocks, while blue edges represent edges extending the forest of black edges to a MST of
the whole space X, as described in Example 2.3.
A key property of the cone decomposition is that it respects the single linkage clustering map, in the following
sense. Recall that the single linkage clustering map sends a weight/metric w to an ultra-metric sl(w) having the
following two alternative definitions:
sl(w) = sup{u ∈ UltX
∣∣u ≤ w} (3)
sl(w)xy = max{we
∣∣ e separates x from y in T} (4)
which results in every MST of w being an MST of sl(w) (Ref. 20, Proposition A.1). Moreover, an explicit formula
for the pre-image of an ultra-metric u ∈ UltX under sl(·) is obtained (Ref. 20, Lemma 2.6 and Equations 5,9):
sl−1(u) =
⋃
T∈MST(u)
C(T, u) , C(T, u) = {w ∈MetX |u ≤ w ≤ ω(Tu)} , (5)
where ω(Tu)xy is the cumulative distance from x to y along the tree T as defined by the weights incurred from
u. In other words, w ∈ C(T, u) if and only if wxy lies between the maximum of the weights on the edges between
x and y on T and the sum of those weights, for all x, y ∈ X.
In this way, we see that pre-image under SLHC of a fixed ultra-metric u is, essentially†, the disjoint union of
compact polytopes indexed by the collection MST(u) of minimal spanning trees associated with u. Moreover, the
following lemma demonstrates MST(u) is an invariant of the combinatorial hierarchy S(u) determined by u. This
†That is, up to overlaps of Lebesgue measure zero
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motivates our attempt, realized in the next section, of considering the cardinality of MST(u) as a surrogate for an
entropy measure associated with S(u), the number of minimal spanning trees supported by S(u) representing
the “degree of uncertainty” regarding what metric may have produced S(u) through SLHC clustering.
Lemma 2.4. Let u be an ultra-metric. The collection of spanning trees T such that C(T ) intersects sl−1(u) in
a set of positive Lebesgue measure depends only on the combinatorial structure of u.
This last observation merits a more careful study of the relationship between MST(u) and S(u) for an ultra-
metric u.
Definition 2.5. Let T ∈ Trees(X) and P be a partition of X. We say that P is compatible with T if P is the
partition induced by the connected components of a spanning sub-forest of T .
Lemma 2.6 (Compatibility Lemma). Let w ∈ MetX . Then the partition [w]ε is compatible with every
T ∈ MST(sl(w)), for every ε ≥ 0.
The proof of this lemma amounts to a restatement of a well-known algorithm for computing sl(w) out of a
minimum spanning tree for w. Our goal in presenting it, however, is to reverse the procedure and turn it into a
tool for computing MST(u) out of an ultra-metric u. We close the preliminaries section by stating the following
well-known fact as a corollary of the last lemma:
Corollary 2.7. Let u ∈ UltX with structure S(U) : P0, . . . , Pk. Then, for any T ∈ MST(u) and t = 0, . . . , k− 1
the partition Pt coincides with the partition of X into connected components of the forest obtained from T by
removing all the edges of the k − t highest lengths. In particular, the top split of u is obtained by removing from
T all the edges of length diam(X,u).
3. AN ENTROPY FOR DISCRETE HIERARCHIES
The decomposition of the space of metrics into the cones C(T ) (T ∈ Trees(X)) hints at the possibility of viewing
Trees(X) as a very coarse discretization of MetX . The matching decomposition of sl
−1(u) given by (5) then
supports the point of view that S(u) should be seen as defining a ‘macro-state’ in a space of ‘micro-states’
represented by all possible spanning trees of KX . By analogy with Boltzmann’s definition of entropy as the
number of micro-states consistent with a given macro-state, then we define entropy as follows.
Definition 3.1. Let u ∈ UltX . The discrete entropy of u is the quantity
DH(u) := − 1
|X|
log
|MST(u)|
|Trees(X)|
. (6)
The number of spanning trees of a complete graph on n vertices is, by Cayley’s Formula, nn−2. Assuming the
correctness of the assertion in Example 2.3, it is then clear that
∣∣MST (ηP )∣∣ = |P ||P |−2∏B∈P |B||B|−2, whereas
|Trees(X)| is |X||X|−2. From these, we see that
DH(ηP ) = − 1
|X|
(
(|P | − 2) log |P |+
∑
B∈P
(|B| − 2) log |B| − (|X| − 2) log |X|
)
.
Extending this simple calculation inductively allows us to obtain a formula for general ultra-metrics.
3.1 Counting Minimal Spanning Trees
Lemma 2.4 demonstrates that S(u), for u ∈ UltX , completely determines MST(u), yet a more detailed description
of MST(u) in terms of S(u) is possible.
Lemma 3.2. Let u ∈ UltX , ε ≥ 0 and P = [u]ε. Let π : KX −→ KP denote the natural quotient map sending
each x ∈ X to its block under P (denoted P (x)), and let ū ∈ UltP be defined by:
ūP (x)P (y) = uxyη
P
xy =
{
uxy if P (x) 6= P (y)
0 if P (x) = P (y)
(7)
Then every T ∈ MST(u) is the union of a spanning forest F and a set of edges G satisfying –
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1. The connected components of F induce the partition P on X;
2. For every x, the connected component F (x) of F containing x satisfies F (x) ∈ MST
(
u
∣∣
P (x)
)
.
3. The contraction map π restricts to an injective mapping of G onto an element of MST(ū).
Conversely, any tree T of this form lies in MST(u). One quickly notes the following corollaries.
Corollary 3.3. If u, v ∈ UltX satisfy S(u) ⊆ S(v) then |MST(u)| ≥ |MST(v)|.
Corollary 3.4. Let u ∈ UltX and let P be its top split. Then:
|MST (u)| = |X||P |−2
∏
B∈P
|B| · |MST(u|B )| (8)
3.2 Shannon Entropy and Hierarchical Entropy
We seek a more practical way of computing DH(u) for ultra-metrics u ∈ UltX . Corollary 3.4 produces the
following interesting identity:
Proposition 3.5. For any u ∈ UltX , if P is the top split of u then:
DH(u) = −
∑
B∈P
|B| − 1
|X|
log
|B|
|X|
+
∑
B∈P
|B|
|X|
DH(u|B ) (9)
An immediate corollary of this identity is the recovery of Shannon entropy from the discrete hierarchical
entropy in the thermodynamical limit:
Corollary 3.6. For each k ∈ N, let Pk =
{
B
(k)
1 , . . . , B
(k)
t
}
be a partition of a finite space Xk such that
limk−→∞ |Xk| = +∞ and
(?) lim
k−→∞
|B(k)i |
|Xk|
= pi ∈ (0, 1)
for all i = 1, . . . , t. Then for uk = η
Pk ∈ UltXk , one has
lim
k−→∞
DH(uk) = H(p1, . . . , pt)
where H(p1, . . . , pt) = −
∑t
i=1 pi log pi is Shannon entropy.
Returning to the general case, we slightly extend the notion of a cluster of a hierarchy used in Ref. 22:
Definition 3.7. Let u ∈ UltX . A subset B ⊆ X is a cluster of u if it is a block of some partition belonging to
the structure of u. We denote the set of all clusters of u by C (u).
The recursive formula for DH(u) may be rewritten in closed form as follows:
Corollary 3.8. Let u ∈ UltX . For each B ∈ C (u), B 6= X, define B+ to be the smallest cluster of u properly
containing B, and set X+ = X. Then:
DH(u) = log |X|+ 1
|X|
∑
B∈C (u)
log
|B|
|B+|
(10)
This formula exposes the key feature of discrete entropy: that it measures “rate of expansion” across the
hierarchy. The summands on the right are all negative, so that DH(u) ≤ log |X|. A slightly less elegant but
more useful formula for DH(u) in some situations is the following reformulation of (10).
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Corollary 3.9. Let u ∈ UltX and let 0 = δ0 < . . . < δm be a sequence of real numbers containing all the
structure heights of u. Write Pi = [u]δi for all i = 0, . . . ,m and, for each B ∈ Pi, denote by ch(B) the set of
B• ∈ Pi−1 contained in B; for i = 0 set ch(B) = ∅. Then:
DH(u) = log |X|+ 1
|X|
m∑
i=1
 ∑
B∈Pi−1
log |B| −
∑
B∈Pi
|ch(B)| log |B|
 (11)
3.3 Functoriality and Extensions
The ‘functoriality’ of SLHC refers to the way SLHC interacts with mappings between datasets, first decribed by
Carlsson and Mémoli.23 This particular kind of interaction enables our analysis of how DH should be expected
to change as samples are added to the database.
In this paper we are specifically interested in how sl(·) and DH relate to extensions.
Lemma 3.10. Fix non-empty sets X,Y with X ⊂ Y and a weight w on Y . Let v ∈ WgtX be obtained from w
by restricting it to X, let u = sl(v) and let ū be the restriction of sl(w) to X. Then, for every ε ≥ 0, every block
of the partition [u]ε refines the partition [ū]ε.
Carlsson and Mémoli23,24 observe that, in the language of Category Theory, Lemma 3.10 is a special case
of what is most compactly expressed by saying that SLHC is a functor from the category of weights with non-
expansive maps onto the category of dendrograms. However, our use of this property is too restricted to merit
a detailed review of categorical notions and the Carlsson-Mémoli theory.
4. COUNTERING POISONING ATTACKS
4.1 HC-databases
A dissimilarity-based hierarchical clustering database is any algorithm maintaining a collection Xt of samples
from a universe X (we think of X as a feature space for the possible samples), t always a non-negative integer,
as follows. The initial collection X0 evolves through a 2-step process enacted at every time t:
• Deliberation. A sample packet Pt ⊂X is submitted to the database, and is either accepted or rejected;
• Assimilation. If Pt is rejected then Xt+1 = Xt, but if it is accepted, a compression procedure may be
applied to Xt ∪ Pt to obtain Xt+1.
Both deliberation and assimilation depend in some way on a fixed dissimilarity measure µ : X ×X −→ R that
is provided from the outset, as well as on an HC method, which is SLHC in this article. The clustering hierarchy
at t provided by the database is then the dendrogram encoded by the ultra-metric sl(Xt, µ), with µ restricted to
Xt, by abuse of notation.
The work by Biggio and his collaborators4,16,17 assumes a database with no deliberation powers, focusing
on the analysis of the effectiveness of specific poisoning attacks. In other words, all packets are assimilated, and
poisoning attacks may proceed unhindered — the attacker only needs to tailor her “poison pills” to the particular
HC method employed by the database. Below we present an admittedly primitive — but computationally
efficient — deliberation procedure to enable the rejection of single element packets Pt = {pt} causing “too
much” damage to the existing database hierarchy. In a nutshell, it is assumed that the database designer
has constructed the dissimilarity measure µ on the feature space X in a way that guarantees a satisfactory
coarse-grain classification of the seed data set X0; then, calculating threshold values beyond which differences in
diversity — for example, ∆DHt := DH (HC(Xt, µ))−DH (HC(Xt ∪ Pt, µ)|Xt ) — are no longer tolerable will
ensure the survival of the highest levels of the original hierarchy throughout the life of the database. We present
the details in the next section.
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4.2 A Simple Deliberation Protocol for SLHC-databases
We consider a setting without compression (that is, Xt+1 = Xt ∪ Pt for an accepted sample packet), assuming
single element packets (Pt = {pt} for all times t), yet we do introduce a non-trivial deliberation component based
on the extension property of SLHC discussed above (Section 3.3, Lemma 3.10).
4.2.1 Comparing Consecutive Hierarchies
Suppose at time t we have Xt = X and an incoming sample pt = y. In the notation of Lemma 3.10, we set
Y = X ∪ {y} and w = µ|Y , the restriction of the database dissimilarity measure µ to Y . The quantity ∆DHt
becomes:
∆DHt = DH(u)−DH(ū) , (12)
with the key property that [u]ε refines [ū]ε for all ε ≥ 0.
We apply Corollary 3.9, forming the sequence δi by splicing together the height sequences of the ultra-metrics
u and ū. We have that Pi refines P̄i for all i = 0, . . . ,m, and:
∆DHt =
1
|X|
m∑
i=1
 ∑
B∈Pi−1
log |B| −
∑
B̄∈P̄i−1
log
∣∣B̄∣∣− ∑
B∈Pi
|ch(B)| log |B|+
∑
B̄∈P̄i
∣∣ch(B̄)∣∣ log ∣∣B̄∣∣
 (13)
For any i = 0, . . . ,m− 1 let Ci denote the block of [w]δi which contains y. Since [w]δi refines [w]δi+1 we have
Ci ⊆ Ci+1. The blocks Ci give rise to blocks B̄i := X ∩ Ci = Cir{y} of P̄i, so that B̄i ⊆ B̄i+1 for all i.
We say that B̄i splits, if it contains more than one block of Pi. Let a be the least value of i for which B̄i
splits and let b denote the least value of i such that no B̄j , j ≥ b splits. Then, for every i < a and i ≥ b we have
Pi = P̄i, while for a ≤ i < b and B ∈ Pi we have that B is a block of P̄i if and only if B ∩ B̄i = ∅. Continuing
the computation of ∆DH we obtain:
∆DHt =
1
|X|
b−1∑
i=a
− log |Bi|+ ∑
B∈Pi,B⊂Bi
log |B|
− 1
|X|
b−1∑
i=a
−|ch(Bi)| log |Bi|+ ∑
B∈Pi,B⊂Bi
|ch(B)| log |B|

(14)
=
1
|X|
b−1∑
i=a
(|ch(Bi)| − 1) log |Bi| − ∑
B∈Pi,B⊂Bi
(|ch(B)| − 1) log |B|
 (15)
In other words, ∆DHt depends only on the sizes of clusters of ū which split, and on the sizes of the clusters
of u into which they split at the same height. Hence, if ∆DHt is non-zero then the hierarchy at time t and the
hierarchy of the projected extension disagree over X.
4.2.2 Comparing Truncated hierarchies
It seems sensible to allow some flexibility for change in the lower (deeper) levels of the hierarchies sl(Xt, µ),
which means one would like to de-sensitize ∆DHt to the presence of split blocks Bi arising at height less than a
parameter δ ≥ 0. For this purpose one considers the following operation on ultra-metrics.
Definition 4.1. Let u ∈ UltX and δ ≥ 0. The ultra-metric uδ is defined to be uδxy = uxy if uxy > δ and zero
otherwise. We refer to it as the truncation of u at height δ.
One easily verifies that uδ is, indeed, an ultra-metric. Moreover, truncation at height δ (for a fixed δ) also
enjoys functorial properties similar to those of sl(·), namely:
Lemma 4.2. If u, ū ∈ UltX and ū ≤ u then, for all ε ≥ 0, [uδ]ε refines [ūδ]ε.
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Proof. Let P = [u]δ and Q = [ū]δ. Since uxy ≤ δ implies ūxy ≤ δ for all x, y ∈ X, every block of P is
contained in a block of Q. In other words: P refines Q, and hence ηP ≥ ηQ. Now we make the observation that,
for every u ∈ UltX and δ ≥ 0, uδ may be rewritten as uδ = u · ηP where P = [u]δ. Therefore:
ūδ = ū · ηQ ≤ u · ηQ ≤ u · ηP = uδ.
Hence, for all ε ≥ 0 and all x, y ∈ X we have that uδxy ≤ ε implies ūδxy ≤ ε, or, equivalently, that every block of
[uδ]ε is contained in a block of [ū
δ]ε, as required.
Returning to the notation of the preceding section and fixing some δ ≥ 0, we repeat the argument of the
preceding section, but now applied to uδ and ūδ, to obtain from (15) the equality:
∆δDHt := DH(u
δ)−DH(ūδ) = 1
|X|
b−1∑
i=a(δ)
(|ch(Bi)| − 1) log |Bi| − ∑
B∈Pi,B⊂Bi
(|ch(B)| − 1) log |B|
 , (16)
where a(δ) = min{i | δi ≥ δ}.
Thus, considering ∆δDHt instead of ∆DHt allows us to quantify the projected amount of change in the
hierarchy of the database Xt should the sample pt be accepted while disregarding any possible alteration at
height less than or equal to δ.
It has to be remarked that ∆DHt is not the kind of tool one hopes to employ as part of a proper information-
theoretic approach to the problem of quantifying differences between hierarchies: its sign is not constant, and
there is much interaction among the summands in (15) and (16). It would be much more appropriate to construct
and employ a proper notion of conditional entropy.
5. SIMULATIONS
We provide some preliminary numerical evidence supporting our hypothesis that discrete entropy of combinatorial
cluster hierarchies can be leveraged for detecting poisoning attacks on (single-linkage) hierarchical clustering.
Our simulations use two different data sets. Both consist of two dimensional data. The measure µ, in this case,
coinciding with the Euclidean distance in the plane. The first, following Biggio et al.,4 is a “Banana Dataset”
produced using the PRtools package‡. In this case there is not necessarily a clear prior cluster hierarchy if single-
linkage clustering is applied. The data consist of two classes, each sampled from a corresponding banana-shaped
distribution, resulting in an instance such as the one depicted in Figure 4(left).
The second is a highly hierarchical data set we have constructed. To do this, we choose, N0 points uniformly
at random in the unit square, and then randomly (uniformly) choose at most N1 points (the precise number
is selected randomly from the {1, 2, . . . , N1} uniformly) in a disk of radius not exceeding 0.25 around each of
those points. These second level points serve as centers for disks of radius not exceeding (0.25)2 from which
we sample at most N2 points uniformly, and finally these new points serve as centers for disks of radius not
exceeding (0.25)4 from we uniformly sample at most N3 points (of course, one could continue in the same fashion
to arbitrary depths). The disk radius was reduced in size where necessary to prevent data points being placed
outside the unit square. An instance of such a data set is shown in Figure 4(right).
For each experiment on any of these data sets, we begin with a hierarchy formed by taking a random selection
X0 of F% of the data. This is a key feature of our simulations. We assume that an established structure for the
data is in place and that it has a clear hierarchical architecture. Then we serially introduce the remaining data
with probability 1− p or poisoning with probability p, one sample at a time, until the (possibly poisoned) data
set Xt reaches its original size, |X0| · 100F . We will refer to one instance of this process as a run.
In this work, because of the complexity of the poisoning algorithm and the limited computational resources
committed to this project at this stage, we restricted attention to relatively small data sets. We specify the
parameter values for F ; p; the sizes of our data sets; as well as other parameters, in the results section 5.4. Our
aim is to detect the poisoning in this situation.
‡Source code at http://37steps.com.
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Figure 4. Data sets used for testing detection of poisoning attacks on SLHC. A ‘banana’ dataset from the PRtools package
(left), with 60 points; and an instance of the ‘hierarchical’ data set designed to have a very strongly expressed SLHC
hierarchy (right); here N0 = 3, N1 = 4, N2 = 3 and N3 = 7 and the set has 51 points. This plot was generated using the
Python matplotlib26 library.
5.1 Poisoning Technique
There are many possible poisoning methodologies and we will explore them in future work. Here, to obtain a
proof of concept, we focus on just one. This is essentially that of Biggio et al.4 (the so-called “Bridge (Best)”
attack) though we have been unable to discern the precise nature of the algorithm they employed. Our attempt
to emulate it is described here.
For a partition P of the data, we let YP be the incidence matrix yij = 1 if datum i is in partition element
Pj and 0 otherwise, and YPY
T
P the partition adjacency matrix associated with P . To compare two partitions
P and Q, we use the L1 norm ρ(P,Q) =
∥∥YPY TP − YQY TQ ∥∥1; we call this the adjacency distance. At this point
Biggio et al.use the Frobenius norm (that is, the L2 norm), but the two are equivalent, in any case, and we do
not see that this will significantly change the outcomes.
In the notation of Section 4.2.2, at any time t of a particular run, in order to optimally choose where to insert
a poisoning datum (the poison pill pt), we note that insertion of this datum is intended to merge two branches
(clusters of Xt) at a certain height in the dendrogram. To do this, the datum will be chosen to be at the midpoint
between two clusters (in reality). In other words, the collection of potential poison pills (or PPPs) at time t may
be chosen to be the collection of midpoints of edges of a minimum spanning tree of Xt. We observe that the
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effect of adding a point xPPP from this collection to Xt can potentially be felt at lower leaves in the hierarchy;
in fact, down to a height corresponding to half the distance between those clusters, which we denote by hPPP .
Let u be the ultra-metric associated with the healthy data Xt and let u
′ be the restriction to Xt of the ultra-
metric representing the result of clustering the data base after we insert some xPPP . The adjacency difference
between [u]ε and [u
′]ε is computed for all heights ε from height hPPP to the smaller of the maximum heights of
each dendrogram, which has to equal diam(Xt, u
′). We write
g(xPPP ) = min
ε∈[hPPP ,diam(Xt,u′)]
ρ([u]ε, [u
′]ε) (17)
for the objective function associated with xPPP . Now this is maximized over all locations for the PPP to provide
the actual poison pill pt.
5.2 Poisoning Detection
To detect changes induced by poisoning during a run, we propose to compare the values of DH for the healthy
and poisoned data, as discussed in Section 4.2.2, using the measure ∆δDHt defined in Equation (16), which
equals the difference in discrete entropies of the dendrograms associated with the data sets Xt and Xt+1, after
their truncation at height δ. A non-zero value for this at some height is taken to be a detection of poisoning.
The height of a detector is the truncation height δ at which the entropy is calculated. We are, in effect, running
multiple detectors in parallel. In this preliminary work we will not seek to combine these statistics into a single
detector nor will be undertake a serious statistical analysis of performance.
5.3 Measure of Performance
In measuring performance of the detector (at a given height) we have to take cognizance of the fact that it is
impossible to detect a poison pill inserted to connect two clusters at less than half of the height of the detector,
though it will be detected with a detector at a lower height. At the same time, a genuine sample could cause
the joining of clusters, which, in general motivates raising the height of the detector.
Therefore, from our viewpoint, a success is that a poison attack capable of being detected at a given height
is detected or if a genuine datum or poison attack below the height at which detection is possible is not detected
(of course the latter is always the case).
For each separate run on a data set, initialized with X0, we average detection successes up to time t as a
proportion of total samples added to the data base (that is, divide the total successes by the number of epochs,
t, up that point), for every t, yielding a vector describing the evolution of the success rate over time. This is
repeated over N runs per each of K truncation heights δk = ε
kdiam(sl(X0)). Then, for each truncation height,
a mean success rate vector (averaged over N runs) is formed and plotted against time. In this way, at each
truncation height, we obtain a performance measure that is a function of time (epochs) since the initial hierarchy
is established and poisoning begins.
5.4 Results
Our current preliminary experiments were organized as follows.
The ‘banana’ data set was generated to have two (banana-shaped) clusters consisting of 30 points each. The
‘hierarchical’ data set was generated with parameters N0 = 3, N1 = 4, N2 = 3, N3 = 7 and has 51 points.
The results for Four truncation levels with ε = 0.5 × 10 poisoning runs, each initialized with a random
selection of 75% of the data set. Each of these regimens was repeated twice for each data set, with poisoning
frequencies p = 50% and p = 25%, and the resulting mean success rates are plotted in Figure 5. As can be
observed our approach works very well for the strongy hierarchical data, less well for the Banana Set, though
we emphasize that these results are only preliminary, and that a more principled and optimized detector will be
designed in future work.
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Figure 5. Mean success rate plots for the simulated experiments described in Section 5.4, with the simulation parameters
given in Section 5.4. The plots are: ‘Banana’ (left) vs. ‘Hierarchical’ (right); and 25% poisoning frequency (above) vs.
50% poisoning frequency (below). This plot was generated using the Python matplotlib26 library.
6. CONCLUSION
We have developed a concept of entropy (“discrete entropy”) for a hierarchical structure on a data set in a metric
space. This measures, in a sense, the amount of uncertainty about a finite metric space given the combinatorial
structure of the way it is clustered by SLHC, across scales. We have discussed some of its properties and
formulated it in both a local (10) and global (6) way. While the fact that these two distinct interpretations of
the entropy of a combinatorial hierarchy coincide is of some independent interest, in this work we stress the low
computational complexity of this measure (linear in the number of data points) implied by its local formulation,
in conjunction with its very well-organized interaction with the operations of extension (adding a data element)
and truncation (contracting clusters to points below a fixed scale).
The low computational complexity of this measure, in tandem with its information-theoretical pedigree,
make it an attractive possible alternative to other measures of discrepancy between hierarchies such as those
proposed and surveyed in Ref. 22. Those measures were designed for quantifying such discrepancies on a global
scale (distances between arbitrary hierarchies are considered) rather than for the (at least) seemingly small-scale
transitions such as those exhibited by a meticulously crafted poisoning attack.
It is this constellation of properties, as well as other aspects of the functoriality of SLHC, that motivate this
work and its future extensions. In particular, our immediate concern has been to use this idea to measure the
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changes in the hierarchical structure of data as a result of poisoning attacks. Preliminary simulations on small
data sets suggest that this approach has merit in protecting a single-linkage clustered hierarchy from poisoning
of the kind envisaged by Biggio et al.4
This work is very preliminary and we anticipate further research into combining the multi-height detection
process into a single detector, with appropriate thresholding, and with a statistical analysis of the performance
of the detector. A comparison with other methods is also required, as are more comprehensive simulations.
APPENDIX A. PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. We prove the last item. By definition of the Pi, for all x, y ∈ X and all i = 1, . . . , k we have that ηPixy = 0
iff x, y are in the same block of Pi, iff x, y are in the same block of [u]ε for all ε ≥ εi−1, iff uxy ≤ εi−1. Thus, uxy
equals εi−1 for the smallest i that satisfying η
Pi
xy = 0. Equivalently, uxy equals (εi−1η
Pi−1)xy where i is smallest
such that ηPixy = 0. For j ≤ i−1 we then have η
Pj
xy = 1 and εj ≤ εi−1 leading to (εjηPj )xy ≤ (εi−1ηPi−1)xy = uxy,
as required.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.4
Proof. By (5), C(T ) intersects sl−1(u) in a set of positive measure if and only if T ∈ MST(u). Given u, v ∈ UltX ,
Lemma 2.2 in Ref. 20 guarantees MST(u) = MST(v) provided ue ≤ uf ⇐⇒ ve ≤ vf for all edges e, f . The latter
condition holds whenever u and v have the same structure, by Equation (2).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.6
Proof. Set u = sl(w). Note that [u]ε = [w]ε = P take any T ∈ MST(u). Let F be the sub-forest of T obtained by
removing those edges xy ∈ T satisfying uxy > ε. Let Q be the partition induced from the connected components
of F . Equivalently, Q(x) = Q(y) if and only if the path p(T )xy joining x with y along T only contains edges
of u-length not exceeding ε. Since u is an ultra-metric, this implies that Q refines P . It remains to show that
no block of P is split by Q, or, equivalently, that no two points x, y ∈ X with uxy ≤ ε have an edge e of
length exceeding ε somewhere along p(T )xy. However, if such a configuration existed, (T − e) + xy would have
constituted a spanning tree of smaller weight than that of T – a contradiction to T ∈ MST(u).
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. First, if T ∈ MST(u) then lemma 2.6 implies P is compatible with T , which means that T ∩ KB is a
spanning tree of KB for all B ∈ P . Letting G = Tr
⋃
B∈P KB we observe first that no two edges of G join
the same blocks (or else there would be a cycle in T ), and that π(G) contains no cycles because a cycle in π(G)
would lift to a cycle in T . We conclude that T ∩KB is a minimal spanning tree of u|B for every B ∈ P (else
replace an offending T ∩KB with a spanning tree of lower weight, reducing the overall weight of T ). Thus, every
T ∈ MST(u) has the required form.
Conversely, suppose T ∈ Trees(X) satisfies 1.-3., and let T ′ ∈ MST(u) have κ(T, T ′) as small as possible.
From the above observations, both trees are compatible with P , and T ∩ KB = T ′ ∩ KB for all B ∈ P . Let
F =
⋃
B∈P KB and set G = TrF and G′ = T ′rF . Now it is time to use the fact that π(G), π(G′) ∈ MST(ū):
by the definition of P and F , all the edges in G and G′ have lengths strictly greater than ε; this means that the
total weight of G (under u) equals the total weight of π(G) (under ū), and hence also equals the total weight of
π(G′), which is the total weight of G′. Thus, T had been a minimal spanning tree for u to begin with.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 3.3
Proof. Enriching S(u) imposes additional constraints on the set of minimum spanning trees, resulting in MST(v) ⊆
MST(u).
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A.6 Proof of Corollary 3.4
Proof. By the preceding lemma, a tree in MST(u) is the disjoint union of a choice of tree TB ∈ MST(u|B ) for each
block of P , with a set of edges G ⊂ KX having the property that π restricts on G to a bijection with the edge
set of a tree T ∈ Trees(P ). There is no restriction on T because the metric ū in our case (P is the top split of
u) is a scalar multiple of the standard unit discrete metric on P . Thus, for each T ∈ Trees(P ), the set G may
be chosen in NT :=
∏
AB∈T |A||B| way, and the total number of ways to pick G is therefore
∑
T∈Trees(P )
NT =
(∑
B∈P
|B|
)|P |−2
·
∏
B∈P
|B| = |X||P |−2
∏
B∈P
|B| , (18)
by the Cayley-Prüfer spanning tree enumerator formula,25 and (8) follows.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof. We apply corollary 3.4 directly, while observing
|X| − 2 = (|P | − 2) +
∑
B∈P
(|B| − 1) (19)
We calculate:
DH(u) = − 1
|X|
log
|X||P |−2
∏
B∈P |B| · |MST(u|B )|
|X||X|−2
(20)
= − 1
|X|
log
(
|X||P |−2
|X||X|−2
·
∏
B∈P
|B||B|−1 |MST(u|B )|
|B||B|−2
)
(21)
= − 1
|X|
log
∏
B∈P
(
|B|
|X|
)|B|−1 |MST(u|B )|
|B||B|−2
(22)
= −
∑
B∈P
|B| − 1
|X|
log
|B|
|X|
+
∑
B∈P
|B|
|X|
DH(u|B ) , (23)
as required.
A.8 Proof of Corollary 3.6
Proof. Applying proposition 3.5 to uk we obtain
DH(uk) = −
t∑
i=1
|B(k)i | − 1
|Xk|
log
|B(k)i |
|Xk|
+
t∑
i=1
|B(k)i |
|Xk|
DH(0) . (24)
Since the zero metric admits any spanning tree as a minimum one, DH(0) = 0 and we are done.
A.9 Proof of Corollary 3.8
Proof. First we may assume u is positive-definite. Indeed, if u is not positive definite, then pick ε > 0 satisfying
ε < uxy for any x, y satisfying uxy > 0. Letting P be the partition of X into singletons, it is clear that the
structure of the ultra-metric v = u + εηP equals the structure of u with the addition of P . In particular, any
spanning tree that is compatible with u is compatible with v and vice-versa, resulting in DH(v) = DH(u).
Next we rewrite the identity from prop. 3.5:
DH(u) = HX(P ) +
∑
B∈P
|B|
|X|
DH(u|B ) +
1
|X|
∑
B∈P
log
|B|
|X|
, (25)
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where this time P is the first split of u and HX(P ) is the Shannon entropy of P with respect to the uniform
distribution on X. Denote
S(u) : P0(u)  P1(u)  . . .  Pt−1(u) = P (26)
and set Ck = Pt−1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pt−k for 1 ≤ k ≤ t. We claim the following formula holds for all k:
DH(u) = HX(Pt−k) +
∑
B∈Pt−k
|B|
|X|
DH(u|B ) +
1
|X|
∑
B∈Ck
log
|B|
|Bu|
(27)
Note that the particular instance of k = t finishes the proof: P0 is the partition of X into (equiprobable)
singletons, giving HX(P0) = log |X| while DH(u|B ) = 0 for all the B ∈ P0, as they are all singletons.
Using induction on k, and having verified the case k = 1 already, assume (27) holds for k = m where
1 ≤ m < t is integer and consider the case k = m + 1. Throughout the following computation the notation Bj
refers to blocks in the partition Pt−j (j may vary):
DH(u) = HX(Pt−m) +
1
|X|
∑
B∈Cm
log
|B|
|Bu|
+
∑
Bm
|Bm|
|X|
DH(u|Bm )
= HX(Pt−m) +
1
|X|
∑
B∈Cm
log
|B|
|Bu|
+
∑
Bm
|Bm|
|X|
− ∑
B′m+1⊂Bm
∣∣B′m+1∣∣− 1
|Bm|
log
∣∣B′m+1∣∣
|Bm|
+
∑
B′m+1⊂Bm
∣∣B′m+1∣∣
|Bm|
DH
(
u
∣∣∣B′m+1 )

= HX(Pt−m) +
∑
Bm
|Bm|
|X|
HBm(Pt−m−1|Bm)
+
1
|X|
∑
B∈Cm
log
|B|
|Bu|
+
∑
Bm
∑
B′m+1⊂Bm
1
|X|
log
∣∣B′m+1∣∣
|Bm|
+
∑
Bm
∑
B′m+1⊂Bm
∣∣B′m+1∣∣
|X|
DH
(
u
∣∣∣B′m+1 )
= HX(Pt−m−1) +
∑
B∈Cm+1
log
|B|
|Bu|
+
∑
Bm+1
|Bm+1|
|X|
DH
(
u
∣∣
Bm+1
)
,
concluding the induction.
A.10 Proof of Corollary 3.9
Proof. Starting with the representation of DH(u) given by Corollary 3.8, observe we may rewrite it in the form:
DH(u) = log |X|+ 1
|X|
m−1∑
i=0
∑
B∈Pi
log
|B|
|B+|
,
where, for the purpose of this computation only, we redefine B+ as the unique block of Pi+1 containing B. This
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allows for the following re-indexing and consequent development:
DH(u) = log |X|+ 1
|X|
m∑
i=1
∑
B∈Pi
∑
B• ∈ ch(B) log |B
•|
|B|
= log |X|+ 1
|X|
m∑
i=1
∑
B∈Pi
∑
B• ∈ ch(B)(log |B•| − log |B|)
= log |X|+ 1
|X|
m∑
i=1
 ∑
B∈Pi−1
log |B| −
∑
B∈Pi
|ch(B)| log |B|
 ,
as desired.
A.11 Proof of Lemma 3.10
Proof. Formally, we have a map j : X −→ Y defined by j(x) = x, the inclusion map. Restricting any weight on
Y to X is then tantamount to applying to it the map j∗, defined by j∗(w)xy := wj(x)j(y). Thus, for the particular
v, w in our setting we have v = j∗(w).
Now let us consider sl(·) applied to this context, namely: we would like to compare the restriction of sl(w)
to X (in other words “apply HC first, then restrict”) with sl(v) (“restrict, then apply HC”).
Now, it is easy to see that w1 ≤ w2 implies j∗(w1) ≤ j∗(w2). In particular, j∗(sl(w)) ≤ j∗(w) = v. By
equation (3) we have j∗(sl(w)) ≤ sl(v) because j∗(sl(w)) is an ultra-metric (the restriction of an ultra-metric on
Y to X is clearly an ultra-metric on X). In particular, for any ε ≥ 0 and x, y ∈ X we have that sl(v)xy ≤ ε
implies j∗(sl(w))xy ≤ ε. This proves the lemma.
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